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In 1973, in Miller v. California,' the Supreme Court wrested from the
"tortured history" 2 of its obscenity doctrine the modern constitutional defi-
nition of "obscenity." Miller set forth a new test to distinguish sexually
explicit art3 from obscenity, protecting such art only if it demonstrates
"serious . . . artistic . . . value."" Yet Miller was drafted at a radical
turning point in the history of art, and the new art that has arisen since
Miller has rendered standards such as "serious artistic value" obsolete.
This new art-Post-Modern art'-rebels against the demand that a work
of art be 'serious, or that it have any traditional "value" at all. Miller,
then, evaluates contemporary art by the very standard which that art
seeks to defy.6
1. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
2. Id. at 20.
3. This Note will not define the term "art"; rather, it will argue that we cannot define the term
because contemporary art, by its very nature, will defy any definition that we assign to it. The Note
will use the term "art" to describe works that critics, scholars, galleries, museums, and "artists" gen-
erally discuss as "art." This is not to say that critical acceptance by that community is definitive as to
what "art" means. From the author's point of view, critical acceptance is sufficient reason to call a
work "art," but not a necessary one; works currently not accepted by the "art" world nonetheless may
be "art."
4. Mdler, 413 U.S. at 24.
5. For an explanation of Post-Modern art, see infra notes 28-70 and accompanying text.
6. An understanding of the danger that Miller poses for contemporary art has become particularly
pressing since the recent "Mapplethorpe" controversy over government funding of sexually explicit
art, see infa notes 79-81 and accompanying text, not only because that debate evidences an increas-
ingly hostile and therefore dangerous climate for sexually explicit art, but because the artistic value
test in Miller has now been incorporated into the new standard for Federal funding of art. Art which
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Section I of the Note explores the Miller test, its critics, and the Court's
recent reexamination of the test in Pope v. Illinois.7 Section II articulates
three major themes of Post-Modern art and traces their implications for
the Miller standard. After demonstrating the inadequacy of the Miller test
for protecting contemporary art, this Note, in Section III, examines other
standards that might offer more protection for art than Miller does. None-
theless, even these standards fail to provide sufficient protection for artistic
expression, for, as the Note concludes, the two basic goals of obscenity
law-protecting art while controlling obscenity-lie in a state of irrecon-
cilable conflict due to the nature of contemporary art.8
I. THE MILLER TEST AND ITS CRITICS
In 1957, when the Supreme Court in Roth v. United States' explicitly
proclaimed that a sector of speech defined as "obscenity" fell outside of
the constitutional protection of the First Amendment,' 0 it necessarily made
the definition of "obscenity" a matter of constitutional law." The realm of
the "obscene" became a no-man's land surrounding the fortress of the
First Amendment: only speech that could defy the definition of obscenity
and gain access to the First Amendment's safe walls would merit protec-
tion. Yet the determination of these boundaries proved far from clear-cut
for the Supreme Court; it had set out to define what in fact "may be
indefinable."' 2 The "intractable obscenity problem"' plagued the Court
in the years that followed Roth. It was not until the 1966 case of Memoirs
v. Massachusetts' that the Court attempted to clarify its definition, and
even then it failed to produce a majority opinion.
Finally, in 1973, in Miller v. California, the Court articulated a new
fails the Miller "serious value" test no longer will have access to Federal grants. See Pub. L. No. 101-
121, § 304, 103 Stat. 741, 741-42 (1989) (banning Federal grants for "obscene" art which lacks
serious value).
7. 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
8. This Note does not purport to argue which of these two conflicting goals-the prohibition of
obscenity or the full protection of art-is more important to society. It argues only that we choose one
goal at the expense of the other; we must, therefore, evaluate what we lose by choosing either alterna-
tive. Philosophers of aesthetics too numerous to mention in the context of this Note have discussed the
inherent and societal values of art. For a legal theory of the importance of art to society, see
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245, 262 (literature and arts
can inform political process by imparting sensitivity to human values). For legal arguments that other
concerns should take precedence over the protection of art, see Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20-29 (1971) (art merits no First Amendment protec-
tion), Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-63 (1973) (explaining importance to commu-
nities of prohibiting obscenity), and C. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987) (pornography
institutionalizes second-class, victimized status for women in society).
9. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
10. Id. at 484-85.
11. See H. KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION 37 (1988).
12. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
13. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring
and dissenting).
14. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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definition of "obscenity" that reigns supreme to this day. For the first
time in sixteen years, a majority of justices had managed to agree on a
definition of a term that had "produced a variety of views among the
members of the Court unmatched in any other course of constitutional
adjudication."15 Yet in the shadow of the" Court's relative triumph was the
disenchantment of a solid four-member dissenting minority (as well as a
community of legal scholars) who had abandoned all faith in Miller's pro-
ject and had grown to doubt the possibility of a constitutionally acceptable
distinction between obscenity and protected spedch.
Miller v. California set forth a three-part test for determining whether
a given work should be labelled "obscene":
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law;
and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artis-
tic, political, or scientific value. 6
Since it was drafted in 1973, the Court has continued to follow Miller
despite persistent criticism of the test.17 Critics have pointed to the Court's
failure to provide a workable definition of obscenity' 8 and have argued
that because the standard is vague and unpredictable, it will chill speech
that ought to be protected.' 9
Certain critics have focused specifically on the third prong of the test, in
part because it represents a significant departure from the Court's prior
obscenity holdings. Whereas both Roth and Memoirs had held that a work
15. Interstate Circuit, 390 U.S. at 704-05, 705 n.1 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
16. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citations omitted). Miller involved an obscenity
prosecution against a defendant who had mailed brochures advertising sexually explicit books.
17. E.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Miller standard is vague, fails to provide adequate notice, will chill protected speech, and will mire
courts in case-by-case litigation); Note, Community Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity Under
Miller v. California, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (1975) (Miller's ambiguity will chill protected speech);
The Supreme Court, 1972 Tern, 87 HARV. L. REV. 57, 160-75 (1973) (same).
18. This problem did not originate with Miller; it has been a constant point of disagreement for
the Court ever since Roth. See H. KALVEN, supra note 11, at 33-53. Summing up the Court's frus-
trating task, Justice Stewart wrote that although it may be impossible to define hard-core pornogra-
phy, "I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Miller did provide that only "hard-core" sexual imagery should be banned under the test, 413 U.S.
at 27, but failed to give a definition for the term. See, e.g., F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY
109-13 (1975) (noting that meaning of hard-core pornography has "been elusive for many years. .
[It is more of a conclusion than a test").
19. See supra note 17. For a discussion of the chilling effect of obscenity regulation in general, see
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 480-81 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); F. SCHAUER, FREE
SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 178-79 (1982) (noting obscenity regulation's history of plain
errors in banning what we now consider great works of art).
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had to be "utterly without redeeming social value"20 before it could be
banished to the constitutional no-man's land of "obscenity," Miller re-
jected this expansive test in favor of a standard that protected less art and
was easier for the prosecution to meet.2" A work of art now needed to
possess "serious value" to gain protection. As Justice Brennan noted in his
dissent to Miller's companion case, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton:
The Court's approach necessarily assumes that some works will be
deemed obscene-even though they clearly have some social
value-because the State was able to prove that the value, measured
by some unspecified standard, was not sufficiently "serious" to war-
rant constitutional protection. That result is . . . an invitation to
widespread suppression of sexually oriented speech.22
In the 1987 case of Pope v. Illinois,23 the Court, added a new edge to
Miller's third prong that only exacerbated the deep problems that plague
the test.24 Since Pope, the "proper inquiry is . . . whether a reasonable
person would find [serious] value in the material."25 But as Justice Scalia
noted wearily: "Since ratiocination has little to do with esthetics, the
fabled 'reasonable man' is of little help in the inquiry. . . . [T]oday's
opinions . . . display the need for reexamination of Miller."26
The Pope Court, like the Miller Court, assumed that serious artistic
value provided a workable standard that could distinguish sexually ex-
plicit art from obscenity. In the following section, this Note argues that
this basic assumption is wrong, that serious value is no longer a coherent
standard in the face of recent developments in art.
II. POST-MODERNISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MILLER
Chief Justice Burger devised the Miller test for "serious artistic value"
at precisely the time that Modernism in art was in its death throes. One
year earlier, the art critic Leo Steinberg had been perhaps the first to
apply the name "Post-Modernism" 2 to the revolutionary artistic move-
ment that was budding just as Miller was decided. That the Court drafted
20. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (emphasis in original).
21. 413 U.S. at 22 (interpreting Roth's third prong as creating "a burden virtually impossible to
discharge" for prosecution).
22. 413 U.S. 49, 97 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also H. KALVEN, supra note 11, at 50
(new test no longer protects art that previous obscenity holdings would have protected).
23. 481 U.S. 497 (1987). Pope was an obscenity prosecution against two attendants at "adult"
bookstores in Illinois. Id. at 499.
24. The Pope Court confirmed what had already been implicit in Miller: its third prong requires
the application of an objective rather than a community standard. Id. at 500-01. In Smith v. United
States, 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977), the Court had noted that Miller implicitly rejected a community
standards approach to interpretation of the third prong of the test.
25. Pope, 481 U.S. at 500-01.
26. Id. at 504-05 (Scalia, J., concurring).
27. See L. STEINBERG, Other Criteria, in OTHER CRITERIA: CONFRONTATIONS WITH TWENTI-
ETH-CENTURY ART 91 (1972).
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Miller at this turning point in art has dramatic implications, for the meta-
morphosis into Post-Modernism that occurred in the 1960's and early
1970's has led not to another style in art, but to an entirely transformed
conception of what "art" means.28
Attempts to define Post-Modernism ii the arts often have failed, per-
haps because Post-Modernism represents not a single, clear movement,
but a pluralist and many-faceted rebellion against the dictates of Modern-
ism.29 To begin to understand recent art, therefore, we must first consider
Modernism."0 It was a movement that began in the 1860's with the
painter Manet and self-destructed-or some would say reached its apo-
gee-in the Minimalist movement of the late 1960's.31 Yet it was a partic-
ular breed of Modernism-"late Modernism"-that became the focus of
Post-Modern art. Critics and artists of the Post-Modern era universally
seem to equate the Modernism against which they rebel with the formalist
doctrine of Clement Greenberg, the leading critic of late Modernism,
whose critical vision of art triumphed in the 1950's2
Modernism as articulated by Greenberg and his peers was a purist
movement.3 3 Greenberg believed that art could "maintain [its] past stan-
dards of excellence" ' by using the "characteristic methods of a discipline
to criticize the discipline itself-not in order to subvert it, but to entrench
it more firmly in its area of competence."35 Late Modernism distinguished
between good art and bad art36 by demanding that good art be pure, self-
critical, original, sincere, 37 and serious.
Post-Modernism rebelled against the stifling and idealistic confines of
28. Wallis, What's Wrong with This Picture?, in ART AFTER MODERNISM: RETHINKING REP-
RESENTATION (B. Wallis ed. 1984). But see Habermas, Modernity: An Incomplete Project, in THE
ANTI-AESTHfTIC 3 (H. Foster ed. 1983) (current period represents continuation of Modernism).
29. Jameson, Postmodernisn and Consumer Society, in THE ANTI-AESTHETIC, supra note 28, at
112.
30. See generally MODERN ART AND MODERNISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY (F. Frascina & C.
Harrison eds. 1982).
31. For an account of Minimalism's relation to Modernism, see H. FOSTER, Against Pluralism,
in RECODINGS: ART, SPECTACLE, CULTURAL POLITICS 13 (1985).
32. See, e.g., Wallis, supra note 28, at xii; P. HALLEY, Against Post-Modernism: Reconsidering
Ortega, in COLLECTED ESSAYS 1981-1987, at 27 (1988). Michael Fried perhaps rivals Greenberg as
an influential critic of late Modernism. See, e.g., Fried, Art and Objecthood, ARTFORUM, June 1967,
at 12.
33. See, e.g., Greenberg, Modernist Painting, in MODERN ART AND MODERNISM, supra note
30, at 6 ("art . . . in its 'purity' [would] find the guarantee of its standards of quality").
34. Id. at 10.
35. Id. at 5.
36. Clement Greenberg wrote in 1955, "There is good and bad in [contemporary painting], and
. . . the difference . . . owes its realization to a severer discipline . . . ." Greenberg, "American-
Type" Painting, in MODERN ART AND MODERNISM, supra note 30, at 94; see also C. GREENBERG,
Avant-Garde and Kitsch, in ART AND CULTURE: CRITICAL ESSAYS 3 (1961) (finding value in high
art but not in kitsch).
37. See, e.g., Hughes, The Rise of Andy Warhol, in ART AFTER MODERNISM: RETHINKING
REPRESENTATION, supra note 28, at 49 (noting belief "dear to modernism, that. . . art flowed from
the unconscious," thus presumably representing artist's sincere emotions). This notion was exempli-
fied in Modernist Abstract Expressionism.
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late Modernism. It attacked the Modernist distinctions between good art
and bad, between high art and popular culture, between the sanctity of
the art context and real life. Post-Modernism not only rejected the Mod-
ernist demand that art be "serious," it rejected the idea that art must have
any traditional "value" at all. It mocked notions of originality and authen-
ticity; it replaced sincerity with cynicism.
The wording of Miller clearly reflects the Modernist era in which it
was drafted. As an art critic wrote of Modernism, "the highest accolade
that could be paid to any artist was this: 'serious.' '38 It is as if the word
"serious" were a codeword for Modernist values: critics consistently
equate it with the Modernist stance. 9 In fact, the very foundation of
Miller, the belief that some art is just not good enough or serious enough
to be worthy of protection, mirrors the Modernist notion that distinctions
could be drawn between good art and bad, and that the value of art was
objectively verifiable.4" Thus Miller has etched in stone a theory of art
that was itself a product of only a transitory phase in art history-the
period of late Modernism.
Miller, however, has not suddenly become a dangerous standard only
now that Post-Modern art has become the dominant mood of the era.
Coexisting with the Modernist movement itself were ideas which strained
the measure of "serious artistic value." In order to realize his pure ideol-
ogy, Greenberg, the leading late Modernist critic, had been forced to ig-
nore an important twentieth-century counter-tradition to Modernism that
preceded Post-Modernism: Dadaism (exemplified in the work of Marcel
Duchamp), Surrealism, and later, Pop.4' It was this counter-tradition that
ultimately triumphed. Its elements of non-seriousness-of impurity and
irreverence-were like weeds that had taken root and ultimately strangled
the neatly planted rows of Greenberg's Modernist garden, despite all his
diligent tending. Much of Post-Modern art derives from seeds sown by
Marcel Duchamp in the 1920's.42 Although this Note focuses on the inad-
equacy of Miller in the face of contemporary art, it is crucial to note that
Miller was inadequately narrow even before the advent of Post-
Modernism. Like the late Modernist tradition from which the Miller
Court's logic sprung, the Miller standard failed to account for an entire
counter-tradition to Modernist art.
The Modernist standards for evaluating art which are embodied in
38. Davis, Post-Performancism, ARTFORUM, Oct. 1981, at 31, 39.
39. See, e.g., Crow, These Collectors, They Talk About Baudrillard Now, in DISCUSSIONS IN
CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 1 (H. Foster ed. 1987) (noting "humorless seriousness of high
modernism").
40. See, e.g., Wallis, supra note 28, at xii.
41. See, e.g., Buchloch, Periodizing Critics, in DISCUSSIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE,
supra note 39, at 65.
42. See, e.g., Carlin, Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property Law, 13
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS, 103, 104-05 (1988).
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Miller have been destroyed and none have taken their place;43 perhaps the
only standard left is to defy all standards. The Miller test has become as
obsolete as the Modernist tradition in which it was grounded: Miller eval-
uates artistic expression by the very criteria that Post-Modern art seeks to
defy.
A. Themes of Post -Modernism and Their Implications for Miller
What did the Miller Court mean by "serious artistic value"?"" There
are at least three plausible interpretations: (1) the artwork makes an im-
portant and original rather than a marginal and derivative contribution to
art;45 (2) the artwork is "serious" in that it reflects the sanctity and solem-
nity of high art;41 (3) the artist was serious and sincere in his attempt to
make art (rather than obscenity), no matter how successful his ultimate
achievement. 47 This subsection tests each of these three interpretations of
serious value against examples of Post-Modern art.4 " Ultimately, each
will prove inadequate when thus applied because each rests on assump-
tions which Post-Modernism rejects.
43. Se" L. STEINBERG, supra note 27, at 91 (Post-Modernism has left "old stand-by criteria" for
evaluating art "to rule an eroding plain"). Of course, it is still true in the Post-Modern era that
individual critics and schools of criticism have certain standards by which they evaluate art. I simply
mean that there is no longer a universally agreed upon standard, as there was in the days that Clem-
ent Greenberg's ideology dominated late Modernism. This reflects the Post-Modern tendency to un-
dermine and reject the Modernist assumption (based on Kantian notions of aesthetics) that there can
be universal judgments of taste. See Owens, The Discourse of Others: Feminists and Postmodernism,
in THE ANTI-AESTHETIC, supra note 28, at 58.
44. Critics of Miller have pointed to the Court's failure to provide examples of what would consti-
tute serious value. See, e.g., Note, Community Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller
v. California, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (1975); Note, Taking Serious Value Seriously: Obscenity, Pope
v. Illinois and an Objective Standard, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855 (1987).
45. St,, e.g., Andrews v. State, 652 S.W.2d 370, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc) (equating
serious value with important value); H. KALVEN, supra note 11, at 50.
46 S e, e.g., F. SCHAUER, supra note 18, at 145 ("While literature need not necessarily be seri-
ous, or dry, entertainment value or humor cannot be equated with literary value."); see also People ex
tI. Hicks v. "Sarong Gals," 27 Cal. App. 3d 46, 103 Cal. Rptr. 414, 417 (1972) (entertainment
value does not equal literary value); cf Crow, supra note 39, at 1 (noting "[the] humorless serious-
ness of high modernism"); Greenberg, supra note 33, at 5-10 (noting Modernism's rejection of popu-
lar culture in favor of standards of purity, quality, and discipline).
47. The Supreme Court first suggested this interpretation in a pre-Miller ruling, Kois v. Wiscon-
sin, 408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972). The poem in question bore "some of the earmarks of an attempt at
serious art." Se, also United Artists Corp. v. Gladwell, 373 F. Supp. 247, 249 (N.D. Ohio 1974)
("JVhether the artist succeeds or fails . . . is no test of the seriousness of the work or its purpose.");
State v. Walden Book Co. 386 So. 2d 342, 345 (La. 1980) (if intent is to convey artistic idea, then
intent is serious); Main, The Neglected Prong of the Miller Test for Obscenity: Serious Literary,
ArtI1tic, Political, or Sczeatific Value, 11 S. ILL. U.L.J. 1159 (1987) (courts should examine sincerity
of artist's intent rather than artwork itself to determine serious value); Schauer, Speech and
Spetch"-Obseenit. and "'Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Lan-
guage, 67 GEo. L.J. 899, 929 (1979) (serious "must be defined in terms of intent alone").
48. I do not mean to suggest that the three themes of Post-Modernism discussed below represent a
thorough account of the major principles of this anarchic movement. They are simply the aspects of
Post-Modernism that are most relevant for an assessment of Miller, but hardly an exhaustive charac-
terization of Post-Modernism.
The Yale Law Journal
1. The End of Originality and the Avant Garde
"No new tale to tell" -Love and Rockets'4
One of the major hallmarks of Post-Modernism is its rejection of the
Modernist quest to be new, original, and avant-garde.50 Post-Modern art
is aggressively derivative. As the art critic Brian Wallis wrote, "Today no
action, no feeling, no thought we own has not been performed by a thou-
sand movies, commercials, television sitcoms, or magazine articles. Our
society, supersaturated with information and images, not only has no need
for individuality, it no longer owns such a concept." 6'
Consider the appropriation artist Sherrie Levine. In the early 1980's
Levine's art consisted of taking famous art photographs and simply re-
photographing them as a means of deconstructing the Modernist belief in
originality. 2 Or take as an example the painter David Salle, who layers
and juxtaposes images that he appropriates from art history as well as
from popular culture-pornography, fashion illustrations, and
cartoons-in order to show the impossibility of originality in the Post-
Modern era. By joining unconnected images, Salle invites the viewer to
search for a narrative in his paintings, yet none exists." Rather, Salle
seeks to show the muteness and futility of his images in the wake of Mod-
ernism and its emphasis on originality. A critic has called Salle's paintings
"dead, inert representations of the impossibility of passion in a culture
that has institutionalized self-expression."'54 Salle says his paintings are
about "all the paintings I won't make or can't make. .. ."
The Miller test presupposes a theory of art which Salle and Levine
reject. As Harry Kalven wrote of Miller: "It is of course unlikely that
Ulysses will again be banned, but there is a danger under the new test
that a second-rate Ulysses which the Court does not regard as sufficiently
'serious' will be."'56 The problem is that in Post-Modern art, the next
Ulysses is likely to be a work that is precisely about its own "second-
rateness." This is the thrust of Levine's and Salle's art: all they have left
to them is to recycle images, whether from high art or from low culture,
because it has all been done before. Modernism, which equated a first-
49. Love and Rockets, No New Tale to Tell (Big Time Records 1987).
50. See C. RoBBINS, THE PLURALIST ERA: AMERICAN ART 1968-1981, at 1-2 (1984).
51. Wallis, supra note 28, at xvii-xviii; see also Baudrillard, The Precession of Simulacra, in
ART AFTER MODERNISM: RETHINKING REPRESENTATION, supra note 28, at 253, 254 (our culture
now substitutes "signs of the real for the real itself").
52. Krauss, The Originality of the Avant-Garde: A Postmodernist Repetition, OCTOBER, Fall
1981, at 47, 64-66.
53. See Owens, Back to the Studio, ART AM., Jan. 1982, at 99, 103.
54. Lawson, Last Exit: Painting, ARTFORUM, Oct. 1981, at 40, 42.
55. Owens, supra note 53, at 103 (quoting Images That Understand Us: A Conversation With
David Salle and James Welling, LAICA J., June-July 1980, at 44).
56. H. KALVEN, supra note 11, at 50 (emphasis in original).
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rate or serious painting with originality,5" is over. By celebrating their
derivativeness, artists like these attack one of the basic standards that es-
tablished the value of Modernist art. Thus if we interpret "serious value"
to mean that a work of art makes a significant rather than a marginal
contribution to art, this standard would fail to protect many Post-Modern
artists. If a Levine photograph of another artist's photograph makes an
important contribution to art, it is only because her work is on some level
about her inability to make an important contribution to art.
2. Defiance of Serious Artistic Value
[T]he 80's has been the decade in which art that denies the value of
art has become the most valuable art around.8
A second possible meaning for "serious value" may be that the work of
art reflects the sanctity and solemnity of high art, as opposed to mass
culture. But one of the essential tenets of Modernism that Post-
Modernism attacks is the canonical distinction between high art and pop-
ular culture.59 Thus a critic wrote in 1975 that Andy Warhol had "liqui-
dated the century-old [Modernist] tension between the serious artist and
the majority culture."6 Post-Modern artists reject the solemnity associ-
ated with late Modernism by incorporating images of kitsch, humor, en-
tertainment, and media into their work.6 For example, the artist Julie
Wachtel traces cartoon figures from cheap greeting cards directly onto
canvas. Her paintings reject "not just the idea of originality but the idea
of Quality." 2 Is "serious value" an appropriate standard by which to
judge these works? Wachtel mocks notions of value. Her images are
whimsical and lowly; her message is that even a cheap card is art.
Artist Jeff Koons' work looks like tacky lawn sculpture. For one of his
most recent designs, Koons hired highly skilled Italian artisans to create a
porcelain porn star in the arms of the Pink Panther. As an art critic wrote
of Koons (who has been centrally featured in prestigious recent Whitney
Museum Biennials): "While Pop Artists could make art that looked like
trash and slyly celebrated high art, Mr. Koons makes art that looks like
trash and trashes high art."63 It is as if Koons' central aim is to challenge
the distinction between trash and valuable art that forms the very founda-
tion of the Miller test.
57. See, e.g., Foster, Re: Post, in ART AFTER MODERNISM: RETHINKING REPRESENTATION,
upra note 28, at 189, 191.
58. Frank, Arts Off-the-Vall Critic, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1989, § 6 (Magazine), at 78.
59. See C. GREENBERG, supra note 36, at 3.
60. Hughes, supra note 37, at 54 (quoting critic Harold Rosenberg) (emphasis added).
61. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 38, at 39; Klein, The Audience Culture, in THEORIES OF CON-
TEMPORARY ART 265 (R. Hertz ed. 1985).
62. Levin, Season's Greetings?, Village Voice, Dec. 21, 1985, at 81.
63. Brenson, Shifting Image and Scale, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1988, at C22, col. 5.
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In fact, Post-Modern art does not merely reject the serious value stan-
dard; it defies any standard used to judge it. For example, the late 1970's
movement called "Bad Painting" rebelled against Modernist distinctions
between good art and bad art by employing tasteless images, inept draw-
ing, poor craftsmanship, and" unschooled color.6 This kind of art mocks
anyone who attempts to determine its "value." Its aim is to ridicule the
notion that we can distinguish between works of "serious value" and bad
art. In fact, it challenges the possibility of any critical standard.
3. The Death of the Artist: Sincerity and Intent
Finally, "serious value" might be read as an inquiry into the artist's
intentions rather than a judgment about the work's value. The question
becomes "did the artist sincerely intend to create art?" In those rare in-
stances when serious value is discussed at all by courts and critics, this is
the favored interpretation of the term. 5 But this interpretation also proves
troublesome when applied to recent art because Post-Modernism regards
notions of intentionality and sincerity as naive Modernist constructs.68
Rather than allowing the viewer to rely on these former guideposts, Post-
Modern art often pressures the viewer to consider the absence of the art-
ist, and the presence of multiple possibilities of interpretation which arise
when the artist's intent becomes unknowable. 7
For example, David Salle's strategy of painting in several different
styles within the same painting raises numerous interpretive possibilities
and makes us question whether or not the painter is sincere, throwing into
doubt the Modernist assumption that an artist's style and gesture are his
signature, the guarantor of his sincerity and authenticity.68 Salle presents
sincerity as just another pose. Is Wachtel's tracing of a cheap greeting
card really a sincere effort to make art, or a mockery of art? As a painter
in the Bad Painting movement said, "There is only bad art because there
is no such thing as art."69 Can we say that his paintings are therefore
64. Plagens, The Acadeny of the Bad, in THEORIES OF CONTEMPORARY ART, supra note 61, at
83; Tucker', "Bad" Painting, in "BAD" PAINTING (1978) (catalogue of show at New Museum of
Contemporary Art) (Bad Painting avoids "conventions of high art" and is "shocking and funny").
65. See supra note 47.
66. The Post-Modern critique of sincerity stems in part from the larger movement in Post-
structuralist criticism to expose the impossibility of discovering an author's intentions. For critical
rejections of the claim that the meaning of a text resides in the author's intent, see Barthes, The Death
of the Author, in IMAGE-Music-TExT 142 (S. Heath trans. 1977); Foucault, What Is An Author?, in
TEXTUAL STRATEGIES 141 U. Harari ed. 1979). See also J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1968).
Freud was obviously a central influence on these theories. At the risk of oversimplifying, Freudian
notions of the unconscious lead inevitably to the idea that even an artist himself may be unaware of
his "true" intentions.
67. See, e.g., Brenson, When Self-Consciousness Became King, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1990, § 2, at
H39, col. 1.
68. See, e.g., Krauss, supra note 52.
69. Tucker, supra note 64; see also Jameson, supra note 29, at 116 (one "essential message" of
Post-Modernism is "the necessary failure of art").
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earnest attempts to create art? Terms such as "sincere" and "earnest" are
as inappropriate to describe contemporary art as "serious" is. How can
we use such standards to evaluate the deeply cynical and jaded art that
has arisen in the Post-Modern era?70
B. The Intersection of Art and Obscenity
The most pressing challenge to the Miller test comes from a sector of
Post-Modern artists who not only defy standards like serious value, but
also attack the most basic premise of Miller: that art can be distinguished
from obscenity. Some of the artists described in the following section of
this Note are extremely-and deliberately-shocking and offensive. It
may be hard to understand the value that critics find in this kind of work.
Yet it is precisely because these works are so hard for many people to see
as "art" that they are of pressing importance for the legal community to
consider. The art I will describe below illustrates the chasm that has
formed between contemporary artistic practice and legal theories of
art-theories like Miller, which purport to distinguish art from obscenity
by relying on such standards as "serious artistic value."
An important and established artist to consider is Karen Finley, whose
performance art has been called "obscenity in its purest form." She is
indeed a shocking performer. She smears food into her genitals and has
even defecated onstage; in her performances she graphically describes vio-
lent and bizarre sex acts with priests, children, relatives, and the
handicapped.7 2
Annie Sprinkle is another performance artist whose work challenges the
distinction between art and obscenity. Sprinkle works in the pornography
industry, appearing in magazines and X-rated movies; yet she also per-
forms in art settings, and elements from the two worlds commingle in her
work. For example, she appeared in 1988 at the Kitchen Center for the
Performing Arts'73 "Carnival of Sleaze" Festival. There she gave a per-
formance that included elements from another performance she had given
70. In spite of all of these considerations, surely there exists contemporary art that is "original,"
or solemn, or deadly sincere. Nowhere is this more evident than in the highly political art that has
arisen in response to AIDS. See, e.g., AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS/ CULTURAL ACTIvIsM (D. Crimp
ed. 1989). Nonetheless, the critique of sincerity and intentionality remains central to a great deal of
Post-Modern art; to judge art based on an artist's constructive intent would be to impose on it a
standard that contemporary art as a movement resoundingly rejects. One might argue further, how-
ever, that even art which criticizes notions of sincerity may nonetheless be sincere. "Aren't these artists
serious about deriding seriousness?" the argument might go. Yet how could a court or a jury distin-
guish an artist who is "serious" about rejecting seriousness from one who does so with irreverence or
cynicism about his very project? In the end, this question returns us to the naive question with which
we began and which Post-Modern art rejects as unanswerable: what did the artist intend?
71. Carr, Karen Finley, ARTFORUM, Nov. 1988, at 148.
72. See Carr, Unspeakable Practices, Unnatural Acts: The Taboo Art of Karen Finley, Village
Voice, June 24, 1986, at 17; Karen Finley, ARTFORUM, Mar. 1987, at 130-31.
73. The "Kitchen" is a leading institution for performance and video art in New York.
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for a Screw Magazine party.' When asked if anything made Sprinkle's
performance at the Kitchen "art" and her performance for Screw "por-
nography," a spokesman for the Kitchen said, "Here it was performed in
an art context."7 Another artist who defies the boundary between art and
obscenity is the filmmaker Richard Kern, best known for his "Death
Trip" films. 76 Kern's work features "grisly sex and . . . violence";77 a
spokesman for the Kitchen describes Kern's work as "extremely violent
pornographic art films." 78
Finally, we may consider the work of the late Robert Mapplethorpe,
whose classicized, elegant photographs often take as their subject graphi-
cally sexual portraits of men in homoerotic or sadomasochistic positions,
79
and whose work recently became the center of a raging controversy.80 In
the summer of 1989, in a startling yet prescient act of self-censorship, the
Corcoran Gallery of Art cancelled-at the last minute, after all the invita-
tions had gone out-a Mapplethorpe exhibition. Brandishing Map-
plethorpe's virtuosic and frankly sexual pictures before Congress, Senator
Jesse Helms seized the moment. Although they defeated Helms' more
radical proposal, an outraged Congress nonetheless decided to eliminate
Federal funding for any sexually explicit art that fails Miller's "serious
value" test."'
These artists have so far escaped obscenity prosecutions, yet the Map-
plethorpe controversy bears ominous witness to the anger and misunder-
standing surrounding sexually explicit Post-Modern art. The climate is
ripe for censorship. Not only Mapplethorpe has fallen prey. Police have
stormed some of Finley's performances; 2 worried gallery and club owners
routinely cancel her engagements.8 3 She has been completely banned in
74. Telephone interview with Patrick Moore, Publicity Director, the Kitchen Center for the Per-
forming Arts (Nov. 21, 1988).
75. Id. But Sprinkle told me that although she mixes elements of pornography and art in all her
work, she feels there is a distinction between the two different modes; as she sees it, art provides more
room than pornography for looking at her subject "from lots of different perspectives." Telephone
interview with Annie Sprinkle (Feb. 26, 1990).
76. See Palmer, Film, Electronics and Some Music in Mixed Bill at Ritz, N.Y. Times, May 10,
1987, § 1, at 50, col. 1.
77. Hoberman, Film: Long Day's Journey, Village Voice, Nov. 5, 1985, at 23.
78. Telephone interview with Patrick Moore, supra note 74 (emphasis added).
79. Two of the most controversial Mapplethorpe pictures included one of a man with a whip
protruding from his anus and another of a man's genitals bound in leather.
80. See Sischy, Photography: White and Black, THE NEw YORKER, Nov. 13, 1989, at 124. In
contrast to Sischy's elegaic piece, the staunchly Modernist art critic Hilton Kramer denounced Map-
plethorpe in the New York Times. See Kramer, Is Art Above the Laws of Decency?, N.Y. Times, July
2, 1989, § 2, at 1, col. 1.
81. Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 304, 103 Stat. 741-42 (1989). The new law states: "recently works
have been funded which are without artistic value but which are criticized as pornographic and shock-
ing by any standards." This language implicitly refers to Mapplethorpe, whom Congress bitterly
denounced throughout the debates; the law suggests that Congress believes Mapplethorpe's work
would fail Miller's artistic value test. Id. § 304 (b)(2).
82. Carr, supra note 72, at 19.
83. Harper, Finley's Attack on Taboos at Sushi Isn't For Timid, L.A. Times, Feb. 12, 1988, at
A22, col. 2 (San Diego ed.).
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London.84 In a telephone conversation, Finley commented, "My work has
been censored throughout the country." '85 Filmmaker Richard Kern faces
similar problems. In 1987, after showing the first few minutes of one of
his "Death Trip" films, a New York club ejected Kern and the film from
the premises.8 Annie Sprinkle's recent show, "Post Porn Modernist," has
become the latest target for congressional criticism of contemporary art
and arts funding.8 7
Furthermore, it is not difficult to envision artists like Finley or Kern
experiencing problems under Miller.8" Finley, for example, would seem to
fit squarely under the Court's exposition of the first two prongs of the
standard. The first part of Miller tests for "prurient interest," a term
explained in Roth as "a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or
excretion."8 This seems an apt description of Finley's work. The second
prong of the test, for "patent offensiveness," may be met if the work "goes
substantially beyond customary limits of candor."90 This definition of pat-
ent offensiveness goes to the heart of Finley's work; in fact, her very aim
is to go "substantially beyond customary limits." Miller also gave specific
examples of what a state obscenity statute could regulate; these, as well,
seem applicable to Finley: "Patently offensive representations or descrip-
tions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated," or
"[p]atently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, ex-
cretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals."'"
These are the standards that have saved previous artistic efforts in ob-
scenity prosecutions. For example, the Court in Jenkins v. Georgia92 drew
on the Miller examples to find that the film "Carnal Knowledge," while
it did depict "ultimate sexual acts," did so without focusing on the actor's
bodies, and with "no exhibition whatever of the actor's genitals, lewd or
otherwise. '93 Thus the Court held that "as a matter of constitutional law"
84. Id.
85. Telephone interview with Karen Finley (Aug. 1989).
86. Se Palmer, supra note 76. Another recent example of art censorship took place in Chicago,
where policemen accompanied city aldermen as they entered the school of the Art Institute of Chicago
and removed a painting depicting the late Mayor Washington in frilly women's lingerie. N.Y. Times,
May 13, 1988, at A1O, col. 1.
87. See Carr, New Attack on Arts Funding: This Witch-hunt's for You, Village Voice, Feb. 20,
1990, at 55 (describing political furor over Sprinkle's performance at the Kitchen).
88. See I J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 243 (1987) ("After
reading about the activities of [certain performance artists], one is surprised that to date there have
been no legal challenges to their artistic freedom.").
89. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE §
207.10 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957)). The Court also defined "prurient" as having "a tendency to
excite lustful thoughts." Id.
90. Id.; see also F. SCHAUER, supra note 18, at 102-03 (defining patent offensiveness as repre-
sentation that goes well beyond what society normally tolerates).
91. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973). These standards for prurience and patent offen-
siveness seem equally applicable to Richard Kern and to other artists.
92. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
93. Id. at 161.
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the film was not patently offensive. 4 But these standards would offer no
protection to Finley or Kern. Their work would find protection only
under the serious value prong of the test, and that prong, as this Note has
argued, offers little protection to Post-Modern art. Here is where the real
danger of the Miller test emerges, for its wording does not even contem-
plate the possibility that this kind of art exists.
Perhaps, though, in spite of all these difficulties, the standard of "seri-
ous artistic value" is nonetheless workable: if an artist like Finley were
challenged under Miller, she would certainly be able to find art critics to
testify that her work is art.95 But critical acclaim would not guarantee
such an artist protection under Miller as interpreted in Pope v. Illinois.96
In fact, the reasonable person standard called for in Pope appears to
heighten rather than mitigate the dangers of Miller for sexually explicit
Post-Modern artists.
Justice Stevens' dissent in Pope pointed out the threat this test poses for
unpopular or misunderstood art. The new standard, he argued, will pro-
vide room for juries to disregard the testimony of experts such as art crit-
ics; a juror might conclude that the experts represent an unreasonable
minority, and that the majority of the population, who are less likely to
see the work as valuable, are more reasonable than the critics." This lee-
way for the jury to disregard expert testimony is extremely dangerous for
artists like Finley, Sprinkle, Mapplethorpe, and Kern; because their work
might appear shocking and remains far removed from lay notions of art,
the majority of the population probably would not consider this work to
be art. Only expert testimony could save these artists in an obscenity pro-
ceeding.98 Certainly Senator Danforth's recent comments on the Senate
floor do not bode well for artists like Mapplethorpe. Danforth said of
several Mapplethorpe pictures: "These are gross. These are terrible ...
I do not think they are art. . . and my guess is that not a single resident
of my state would like them. . . . I could just see the faces of the people of
Sedalia, or Cabool, or Mountain Grove. . .. " Apparently, according to
Senator Danforth there is not one reasonable person in Missouri who
94. Id. The Court did not apply Miller's serious value prong to the film; rather, it based its
holding on the first two prongs of Miller. Nonetheless, the Court did describe the film's favorable
reviews and critical acclaim. Id. at 158 & n.5.
95. Of course, an undiscovered artist whose work represents a departure from current artistic
practice might not be able to find critics to testify that his work is art. See infra text accompanying
notes 124-27.
96. 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
97. Pope, 481 U.S. at 512 & n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. See Wright, Defining Obscenity The Criterion of Value, 22 NEw ENG. L. REv. 315 (1987)
(emphasizing need for expert testimony in determining value).
99. 135 CONG. REC. S12116 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1989) (statement of Sen. Danforth). Despite his
distaste for Mapplethorpe's work, Danforth nonetheless proceeded to vote against the Helms
amendment.
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would think Mapplethorpe is even an artist, let alone that his art is of
serious value. Pope is an extremely dangerous standard.1 0
Why should we care at all about First Amendment protection for these
artists? The reader may think that if this is the state to which "art" has
degenerated, or if only this sensationalism masquerading as art is at stake,
then we suffer no great loss if obscenity doctrine does not protect this
work. Yet the reader's resistance to understanding why this work should
be called "art"-indeed, the reader's possible revulsion-is exactly the
point: it illustrates the dramatic clash between lay notions of art and ac-
tual artistic practice. This portion of the Note justifies protection for the
artists described above, but only based on the assumption that we as a
society should extend First Amendment protection to "art" in general.
(Whether or not that is a valid assumption is a question that exceeds the
scope of this Note.)' 0 '
As an art critic wrote of works like Finley's and Sprinkle's: "Under-
standably, to audiences habituated to the traditional boundaries of art, to
audiences for whom easel painting was still the quintessential art activity,
these performances were offensive and even insulting. . . . But [these
works] have been part of. . . art. . . legitimized by. . . critical designa-
tion again and again. '12 Scholars and artists do care about these works.
Although Robert Mapplethorpe is perhaps the most well-known of the
artists described above (and this is certainly true now that Jesse Helms
has made him a household name, the enfant terrible of the art world), all
of these artists have won critical attention. For example, writers have
noted Karen Finley's "disturbing power" °3 and transfixing performances;
many see her work as a powerfully subversive reading of female degrada-
tion in American society.'0 4
Furthermore, Miller poses problems for more artists than the few I
have described above. Any Post-Modern artist who uses sexually explicit
material could be at risk under Miller, and the potential chilling effect is
incalculable. As Karen Finley commented, "There are artists right now
who are changing their art because they are scared."' 0 5 This phenomenon
is particularly troubling because sexual imagery is crucial to many Post-
Modern artworks. The censorship of sexual images has already
threatened, for example, the growing body of political art about AIDS;0 .
100. A further problem arises due to the nature of some recent art criticism. A minority of critics
today tend to question the art status of Post-Modern works which have highly sexualized content. See
Smith, It May Be Good, But Is It Art?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1988, § 2, at 1, col. I (questioning
whether Mapplethorpe's work is "not art"); Kramer, supra note 80 (Mapplethorpe's work is "a
gruesome . . . violation of public decency").
101. See supra note 8.
102. McEvilley, Art in the Dark, in THEORIES OF CONTEMPORARY ART, supra note 61, at 296.
103. Carr, supra note 71.
104. Karen Finley, supra note 72; Carr, supra note 72.
105. Telephone interview with Karen Finley (Aug. 1989).
106. The political and sexual content of the recent AIDS art show, "Witnesses: Against Our
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inevitably, sex figures as an important subject in this work. 17 Other art-
ists depend on their freedom to use sexual imagery as well. For example,
pornography plays a central role in David Salle's painting.' Just as por-
nography operates on a system of seduction (inviting the viewer to look at
sexually provocative images) and frustration (you can look but you can't
touch),' 0 9 Salle's juxtaposed images seduce the viewer into searching for a
narrative, for some explanation of their linkage, yet deny the viewer any
gratification; Salle has declared that no narrative exists. He promises a
revelation and delivers nothing. Thus Salle uses the language of pornogra-
phy to deconstruct the language of representation itself, drawing on the
way pornography tantalizes and cheats the viewer in order to underscore
the failure of the signifier in his own work. To rid his paintings of their
sexual imagery would be to rob them of their power." 0
Ultimately, this kind of art raises the question: should courts be the
judges of artistic merit? As Justice Holmes wrote in 1903:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the
one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss apprecia-
tion. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public
had learned the new language in which their author spoke. It may
be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or
the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when
seen for the first time."'
Or, as Justice Douglas noted, "[W]hat may be trash to me may be prized
Vanishing," led the Chairman of National Endowment for the Arts to revoke-and later, after public
outcry, to restore-funding for the exhibition. See Atkins, Black Thursday, Village Voice, Nov. 26,
1989, at 31; see also Wojnarowicz, Postcards from america: X-Rays from Hell, in WITNESSES:
AGAINST OUR VANISHING 6 (1989) (catalogue of exhibition at Artists Space Gallery).
107. For example, artist David Wojnarowicz's haunting "Sex Series (for Marion Scemama)" jux-
taposes pictures of graphic sex with apocalyptic texts and images to create highly charged political art
about AIDS. See Deitcher, Ideas and Emotions, ARTFORUM, May 1989, at 122.
108. Some art critics (particularly feminists) have attacked Salle for his explicit depiction of
women in servile, sado-masochistic sexual positions. See Fernandez, Exposing a Phallocentric Dis-
course: Images of Women in the Art of David Salle, NEW ART EXAMINER, Nov. 1986, at 32;
Heartney, David Salle: Impersonal Effects, ART AM., June 1988, at 121; see also Mishkin v. New
York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (discussing prurient appeal of sado-masochistic materials).
109. See Koch, The Body's Shadow Realm: On the Itistory of Pornographic Films, OCTOBER,
Fall 1989, at 3, 16-17 (noting inherent frustration of viewing pornographic film).
110. As with Salle's work, sex serves as an artistic metaphor in Mapplethorpe's art as well. His
photographs conflate the marginalized status of the homosexual acts he depicts with the traditional
marginalization of photography in the course of art history-its lesser status when compared to paint-
ing. Mapplethorpe, through his elegant composition and virtuosic form, defiantly classicizes these
"debased" practices; the power of his work lies in its fusion of artistic and sexual discourses. See also
McEvilley, Who Told Thee that Thou Was't Naked?, ARTFORUM, Feb. 1987, at 102 (sexual imagery
crucial to art); Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Towards a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974) (noting importance of "obscene" in literature).
111. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
[Vol. 99: 13591374
Art and Obscenity
by others."' 12 Indeed, the history of art includes many examples of sexu-
ally explicit art works that society denounced as shocking and repulsive
only later to deem them masterpieces." 3 For example, the great Manet
painting, Le Dejeuner sur 1'herbe, caused a venomous uproar in 1863
when it was first shown because of its casual depiction of nudity coupled
with its then-radical paint style.'1 4 Even before the Post-Modern revolt in
the arts, courts have long recognized that they are not proper arbiters of
artistic worth. As Justice Douglas wrote: "We are judges, not literary
experts . . . We are not competent to render an independent judgment
as to the worth of this or any other book . . "..1, And in Pope, Justice
Scalia noted: "Just as there is no use arguing about taste, there is no use
litigating about it. For the law courts to decide 'What is Beauty' is a
novelty even by today's standards."' 6
III. Is THERE ANY WAY FOR A COURT TO DISTINGUISH ART FROM
OBSCENITY IN THE POST-MODERN ERA?
Given that "serious artistic value" has become an obsolete standard in
light of the art that has developed since Miller was decided in 1973, what
should replace it? Is there a better standard which courts could use in
order to distinguish "art" from obscenity? The answer to this question
hinges on how we choose to define art. Rather than embarking on an
exhaustive inquiry into the philosophical question "what is art?," this
Note instead examines practical ways in which courts in obscenity cases
might be able to determine if a work in dispute were art. This section
considers, and ultimately rejects, three possible standards that courts
might turn to for defining art.
A. Is Art Defined by the Artist's Intentions?
The idea grew up in the 1960's that anything an artist designates as art
becomes art." 7 This notion was exemplified in an anecdote about the
painter Robert Rauschenberg. In response to a commission to do a por-
trait for a group gallery show, Rauschenberg sent not a painting but a
112. United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 137 (1973) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); see also Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("im-
po-sible to come to an objective assessment of (at least) literary or artistic value" based on "reasonable
man" standard); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("one man's vulgarity is another's
lyric").
113. See B. TILGHMAN, BUT IS IT ART? 73 (1984).
114. See L. NOCHLtN, REALISM 251 n.19 (1971).
115. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 427 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring).
116. Pope, 481 U.S. at 505 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also State v. Walden Book Co., 386 So. 2d
342, 346 (La. 1980) ("This court is not prepared (nor qualified) to say [the disputed novel] lacks
serious literary value.").
117. Smith, supra note 100. As with so much innovative art in this century, we may trace this
notion to the work of Marcel Duchamp. See Nesbit, Ready-Made Originals: The Duchamp Model,
OCTOBER, Summer 1986, at 53.
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telegram reading "This is a portrait . . . if I say so."'' The gallery dis-
played the telegram on the wall with all the other "portraits." The dis-
tinction between art and non-art in examples like this lies solely in the
artist's intention.
Nonetheless, a definition of art that relied on this standard would prove
unworkable for the courts for two reasons. First, if a court were to accept
that "this is a portrait if I say so," then there would be nothing to prevent
a hard-core pornographer from raising the defense that he intended his
pornography to be art. Secondly, Post-Modern art would render a deeper
inquiry into the purported artist's sincerity futile, because, as discussed
earlier, i"9 Post-Modernism ridicules the notion of sincerity and rejects the
possibility that a viewer can ever discover an artist's true intentions. Thus,
because of the very nature of Post-Modern art, this deeper inquiry would
fail. This standard certainly would protect more art than Miller does, but
it would do so by eschewing any principled controls on the proliferation of
obscenity. In fact, the standard does not even offer a way to guarantee
artistic freedom because it would fail to account for a major theme of
Post-Modern art: the rejection of sincerity.
B. Does Art World Acceptance Define Art?
Perhaps a definition of art could be as simple as this: if it's hanging in
the Museum of Modern Art (or in any art context), it's art.1 20 Although
this standard would obviously protect a great deal of art, it would also
leave a great deal of art unprotected; video, performance art, and graffiti
art, for example, do not depend on an art context for their current status
as art in the eyes of the art world.
Another way to tackle the question would be to ask if the purported art
work directs itself to an art audience.' 2 ' But this standard poses problems
118. Smith, Conceptual Art, in CONCEPTS OF MODERN ART 258 (N. Stangos ed. 1974).
119. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., McEvilley, supra note 102, at 289 ("If something (anything) is presented as art by
an artist and contextualized as art within the system then it is art, and there is nothing anybody can
do about it.").
121. This reasoning seems to underlie the Miller Court's specification that the ruling would affect
only the "public portrayal of hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the ensuing commer-
cial gain ...." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 35 (1973). Yet this qualification does little to
distinguish art from obscenity; art has become a business, and mass-market commerciality and repro-
duction are often its subject. This phenomenon originated with Marcel Duchamp's "ready-mades"
and flourished in Pop art, particularly Andy Warhol's use of commercial art techniques to reproduce
images of consumer society, such as his famous silkscreens of Campbell's soup cans or Brillo boxes,
(Warhol, of course, referred to his studio as the "Factory.") The theme of art as commerce recurs in
the work of many contemporary artists, from Jeff Koons to Ashley Bickerton. Bickerton actually sells
advertising spaces on his art to stores and manufacturers. Thus, a distinction based on commercial
appeal or mass-market production would fail in light of recent art. See Benjamin, The Work of Art in
the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in MODERN ART AND MODERNISM, supra note 30, at 217;
Rateliff, The Marriage of Art and Money, ART AM., July 1988, at 77, 81; cf. Lockhart & McClure,
Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 77 (1960)
(obscenity not inherent in work but rather function of its "appeal to ... the audience to which the
material is primarily directed"); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (holding work obscene
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as well. For example, Karen Finley often performs before "drunken,
rowdy" crowds in nightclubs.' 22 Annie Sprinkle has followers in both the
art and pornography worlds.'23
Could courts defer to critics, scholars, and museums to decide what art
is? This standard would not protect undiscovered artists, developing art-
ists, unpopular artists, or artists who are "ahead of their time." Examples
abound of artists in the current canon who were unrecognized or repudi-
ated in their day.'2 4 As the Court in Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc.* noted,
"What is good literature, . . . what is good art, varies with individuals as
it does from one generation to another."' 25 Relying solely on critical ac-
ceptance to define art will inevitably chill the work of unpopular and un-
recognized artists, the very people who may be most likely to change the
course of art. 26 As the Court has noted in its First Amendment decisions,
it is essential to protect speech from the "prevailing climate of opinion. )127
Courts could not achieve that goal if they were to rely on the prevailing
climate of the art world as the sole indicator of whether or not a work
were art. Although this standard would protect more artists than Miller
does, it nonetheless would threaten to freeze the status quo in art, sacrific-
ing an entire sector of artistic expression.
C. Would a Trier of Fact Know Art When He Sees It?
Art, like obscenity, may be difficult to define, but does that mean that a
judge will not be able to recognize it? Will a court or a jury simply "know
it when they see it"? 128 With Post-Modern art, the answer is no. Because
because of its appeal to "deviant" sexual group).
122. Carr, supra note 72.
123. This kind of art also defeats the distinction that Professor Schauer draws between hard-core
pornography and art. See Schauer, supra note 47, at 922-23. Schauer argues that pornography acts
as a sexual surrogate for the viewer, affecting him only physically, whereas art and other protected
speech appeal to the "intellectual process." Yet Mapplethorpe's work, for example, challenges this
distinction. For some viewers, the erotic content of Mapplethorpe photographs may constitute their
main appeal. Furthermore, Schauer does not account for the long tradition of eroticism in art, in
which sexual arousal is art's primary-perhaps exclusive-goal. See, e.g., United States v. 113 Prints,
128 F. Supp. 280 (D. Md. 1955) (reproductions of Greek, Roman, and Etruscan art and artifacts
which depicted acts of sodomy and other sexual practices were "erotic" and obscene).
124. See, e.g., L. STEINBERG, Contemporary Art and the Plight of its Public, in OTHER CRITE-
RIA, supra note 27, at 3, 15; see also H. Gardner, ART THROUGH THE AGES 690-93 (6th ed. 1975)
(French salon denied access to painters Courbet and Manet).
125. 327 U.S. 146, 157 (1946).
126. Furthermore, some artists-feminists in particular-denounce the critical curatorial estab-
lishment as a biased system that refuses to acknowledge and represent the work of many women
artists. For example, a group of performance artists in New York who call themselves the "Guerilla
Girls" stage protests against what they view as the male-dominated network of museums and gal-
leries. Loughery, Mrs. Holladay and the Guerilla Girls, ARTS, Oct. 1987, at 61. The Guerilla Girls
offer provocative statistics. For example, in all of New York City's museums in 1987, only one one-
person show featured a woman artist. Id.; see also Nochlin, Why Have There Been No Great Woman
Artists?, ARTNEWS, Jan. 1971, at 23.
127. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
128. This is, of course, a reference to Justice Stewart's famous remark on hard-core pornography,
"I know it when I see it," in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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many contemporary artists are so estranged from lay notions of what con-
stitutes "art," courts might refuse to recognize them as artists in spite of
wide critical acceptance by the art community. This standard goes to the
heart of the problem of defining Post-Modern art: its rebellion against
traditional notions of the essential nature of art. The standard would pro-
tect less art than Miller and thus appears to offer no solution.
The real problem with devising a standard by which to evaluate Post-
Modern art derives from the nature of Post-Modernism, a rebellious
movement that attacks any standard used to judge it. The very proposal of
any one standard would defeat the thrust of this Note: that "art" in its
recent incarnation violates any definition we give it. The standards dis-
cussed above provide alternatives to Miller, yet none of them offers a sat-
isfactory test. As long as we proscribe any pocket of sexually explicit
speech, we will endanger some spectrum of artistic speech as well. Al-
though the first two standards would protect some (and perhaps most)
sexually explicit Post-Modern art, and while they both would protect
more contemporary art than the Miller test does, each of these alternative
standards would also leave some art unprotected. And this unprotected art
might be the art we most care to protect: daring or iconoclastic works that
would further challenge our notions of what art is.
IV. CONCLUSION
Many have written about the failure of the Miller Court to provide a
principled definition of "obscenity." The intense difficulty of this task has
generated tremendous disagreement among the members of the Court; it is
the very difficulty that led Justice Brennan, the chief architect of Roth, to
abandon after sixteen years any attempt to define obscenity, to argue that
we should no longer try to exclude obscene speech from the protection of
the First Amendment. "Obscenity" is not the only term in Miller that is
difficult to define. "Art," one of the very areas of speech the Miller Court
attempted to protect, proves equally elusive.
"Art," by its nature, will call into question any definition that we
ascribe to it. As soon as we put up a boundary, an artist will violate it,
because that is what artists do. In the end, we as a society are left with a
choice: either we protect art as a whole or we protect ourselves from ob-
scenity. But we choose one at the sacrifice of the other. It is impossible to
do both.*
* Author's note: After this Note went to press, obscenity indictments were issued against a Cincin-
nati museum and its director for displaying works by Robert Mapplethorpe.
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